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Introduction
Today it is generally accepted that wildlife can be fully conserved by 
involving local' people in its management (Bromley and Carnea, 1989: 10; 
Berkes and Farvar, 1989: 3). The argument is that benefits to the people 
who live with the resources will give value to wildlife. Local people will also 
start to regard wildlife as their own and, because of that, will stop poaching 
them (Murpnree, 1991; Makombe, 1993).
In Zimbabwe, the government.has realised that continuing to alienate people 
from wildlife management - especially those who bear the cost of living with 
wildlife - will not result in the conservation of resources (Murindagomo, 
1989: 29). The government has concluded that alienation leads those 
people who pay the price for living with wildlife to regard it as a pest that 
has to be totally eliminated. It was with a view to conserve wildlife, as well 
as to develop local people, that the government introduced Campfire2. In the 
Campfire programme, a district council can apply for appropriate authority 
from the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management to manage 
all animals in its jurisdiction. Once it receives this authority, the Council is 
expected to pass it down to the local villages which live with, and pay the 
price for living with, wild animais. Such villages can then sell both hunting 
rights and some of the trophy animals to safari hunters contracted to operate 
in communal lands. Villagers use any revenue generated according to their 
own agreed formula.
However, in practice Councils continue to retain power and exhibit a 
corresponding reluctance to pass it down to lower levels (Murombedzi, 
1992). The situation in most districts is that Councils continue to make all 
wildlife decisions on behalf of the village. For instance, the Councils continue 
to enter into contracts with safari operators on behaif of the people; with 
villagers simply receiving money. For many the money has not been much, 
and whatever came was used to develop schools and clinics. The revenue 
does not go directly to the household. It is for this reason, therefore, that 
many local people continue to look at agriculture as the solution to household 
poverty.
Safari operators, whose duty is also to protect villagers from wildlife, 
together with Councils in Zimbabwe, have tried to introduce electric fences 
to communal people since the beginning of Campfire. As conceived by safari 
operators, electric fences would be constructed right around homesteads, 
arable lands and grazing areas.
2 Short for Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources.
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For safari operators, electric fencing in communal areas represents - an 
exciting project. Currently, hunting and shooting is conducted in places 
inhabited by humans. Electric fences would create free hunting zones. In 
these zones, hunters and clients wouid shoot without fearing that iocais 
might get accidentally shot by stray bullets. Operators also want fences as 
these would protect human iife and property from wildlife damage. For many 
of the safari operators, shooting young marauding elephants does not 
constitute good business sense. They say that shooting young troublesome 
elephants, as is demanded by many angry farmers, might deprive them of 
revenue. In fences, operators see a solution in sparing young animais from 
the gun, and allowing them to grow into viable mammals which can earn 
high revenue. Finally, safari operators want a fence that wouid keep people 
out of the wild. By keeping people out of certain areas the operator is able 
to create an image of wiid Africa which he knows wiil sell weii to overseas 
clients. The more he can create an attractive hunting environment for his 
adventurous overseas clients, the more viable his business wiil be. For safari 
operators, electric fences would maximise Campfire's potential to realise high 
profits which wouid benefit iocai people.
In Binga, the local Safari operator has - over the years - been trying to 
interest iocai people into accepting electric fences. In 1994, the Safari 
operator, together with the Council, started a project that was intended to 
surround Kabuba village with an electric fence. The aim of this paper is to 
discuss how the fence was introduced and how local people responded at 
every stage of the project, in addition, this paper traces how iocai people 
rejected the fencing project and threatened to pull out from Campfire on 
which this project was based. The data is aiso given in order to lay ground 
for analysis on why peasants generally resist technology which appears to be 
viable. Before this, I give a brief introduction to the district and the village 
targeted for the fence.
A Brief Description of Binga District and the Study Village
Binga1 district is made up of 1130.926 hectares of land. Of this, 103.500  
hectares is under forest, while 235 526 hectares is under wildlife and 
791 .100  is under communal settlement. Much of Binga is dry. Though 
some areas receive over a 1000mm of rainfall per year, the majority of 
places receive below 700mm. The area has a large population of wildlife 
which includes elephant, lion, buffalo, and impala.
The district’s administrative offices are in Binga. This is where the Council, 
which is composed of iocaiiy elected and executive staff, meets to discuss
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matters that affect the district. The system of local government is as 
follows: A village is led by the village chairman. Six villages make up a
Video which is under the leadership of the Video chairman. Six videos make 
up a ward and this is led by a councillor. The Councillor represents the ward 
at the District Council. Besides councillors, there are council executives who 
are government employees under the Ministry of Local Government. Council 
executives are powerful and can overrule the decisions of council. There is 
also a system of chieftaincy in the district. There are weil over twenty chiefs 
in Binga. The authority of the chief may be confined within the ward but in 
some cases it spans over more than two wards. The chiefs are assisted by 
village heads located in villages. Village heads are rivals of video chairmen 
whom they accuse of usurping their jobs. Chiefs sit in council meetings 
where they are not powerful. They attend meetings as ex. officio members. 
In their areas chiefs remain influential. It is probable that their influence 
derives from their control of, and their right to allocate, land (Dzingirai, 1994  
forthcoming).
One of the actors in the district, constantly finding himself the target of the 
people, is the Safari operator who has been awarded the contract to hunt in 
the area. He pays a concession fee to hunt in the area and also pays for 
trophy animals he shoots in the area. One of his roles is to protect villagers 
and their crops from wildlife. This he must do by shooting any animal which 
the people report as problematic. The Safari operator says that unbridled 
killing will jeopardise possibilities of more revenue. In the end. Council will 
get very little revenue for building clinics and road mending. Villagers are, 
however, worried about the damage caused by elephants on their agriculture 
which caters for their household needs. They, therefore, want menacing 
wildlife eliminated.
The village, which the Council and the Safari operator wanted to surround 
with an electric fence, is called Kabuba. it lies in Chief Sinamagonde’s area, 
south-west of Binga. The village can be reached by a dirt road from Binga 
District Council, some 130km away. It is aiso iinked to Lusulu Tsetse 
Control Camp, about 30km away by a track. The village is in a valley and is 
surrounded by mountains, in the north is the Chizarira National Park, which 
is linked by another track that passes through to Gokwe. The only school, 
Kabuba, is located in that small valley. The village grows cotton which, too 
often, is threatened by marauding elephants from Chizarira located in the 
east. The Safari operator is the one who is tasked to deal with problem 
animals. To date, the people have been dissatisfied with his performance 
and some have appealed to the chief and the police to have him ousted from 
the area. Some people say he does not attend to the wildlife problems at all; 
others say he delays coming to their rescue. Still others say that even when
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he does come, he does not shoot those elephants reported to be threats, as 
is expected by the viiiagers.
The Introduction of the Fence in Kahuba
At a meeting on the 16th June, 1994 the Council Campfire Manager and the 
Safari operator came to the viiiage. He told the people that Council, together 
with the Safari operator, wanted to introduce an electric fence. At first some 
people rejected the idea and did not want any debate about it. It was a bad 
thing that was not to be entertained in the village. Some of the people 
queried the efficacy of the fence project. Such people readily recalled the 
evidence from other districts where the fence failed to protect the villagers 
from wildlife. As one farmer remarked :
" We have heard from her people in Nyaminyami that 
elephants broke throe . .d fence and proceeded to damage the 
fields. If  the Council wants to protect our property from wildlife 
why not do what we say is the solution. Kill all the troublesome 
elephants. They wont be any problem thereafter. Smith used 
to kill elephants he found in the villages and because of that we 
used not to have a wildlife problem. "
Some people within the village saw the fence as an attempt to bar them from 
the use of the natural resources. They pointed out that the Safari operator 
wanted to create a private farm out of their land, and within their midst. It 
was argued that the viiiage depended on the forest for poles, thatching grass 
and edible insects. Villagers argued that the Safari operator wanted to 
prevent people from accessing these resources.
Of greater concern to the whole community was the belief that the fence 
would take away some of their land for agriculture. They saw in the 
proposal an attempt to reintroduce white colonialism.
There1 was the feeling that the 'white man’ wanted to deprive the villagers of 
their iana and eventually make them his servants working for him. Those 
who had adequate land felt that the fence would deprive their descendants of 
land to do agriculture. The viiiage head remarked :
" Where will our children get the land from. If  they go the west 
there is the Zambezi and to the east is the Chizarira Game 
Reserve. "
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Those who had been put in protected villages during the war immediately 
thought that the fence was meant to constrain their movement. They saw 
no freedom in the proposed fence. Throughout the meeting they said that 
they would oppose constraining protected villages.
The Safari operator, together with the Campfire manager, dispelled all these 
fears. They said that the eiectric fence wouid not deny them access to the 
resources. All those who wanted to have access to the resources would do 
so. Farmers would continue to graze their cattle. The Safari operator 
admitted that the fence wouid not remove the wildlife menace totally, it 
was, however, going to reduce it. The Council's representative and the 
Safari operator took turns to say that the fencing project was not intended to 
hinder agriculture. Rather, it was intended to encourage agriculture. On his 
part, the Safari operator vowed to donate a tractor and farming inputs such 
as fertilisers and seeds for all the people who would agree to live within the 
fence. A borehole too would be given to the local people. This would be 
drilled at a place decided on by local people and their leaders. He reiterated 
that the eiectric fence wouid resuit in effective hunting and good agriculture.
The Safari operator added that the labour to put up the fence would be 
drawn from the village. The boundaries would be drawn by the community 
and not by him. He told them that the fence’s boundaries would not remain 
fixed but could be revised to suit the agrarian needs of the people. The 
fence was theirs, he said. Its planning and implementation would be village 
based.
After much deliberation people agreed to the idea. The villagers said they 
would draw the boundaries.
It was in the spirit of this agreement that the community drew the boundary, 
which they put about four kiiometres from the mountain range bordering the 
village and waited for both the Safari operator and Council to bring the 
fencing material and the promised goods.
In Jiiily 1994, the Safari operator came early in the morning and started 
drilling the borehole 4km from the mountain range bordering the village. 
People heard the sound of drilling machines and were only to discover that it 
was the Safari operator sinking the borehole at a place they had not agreed. 
Those who drilled the borehole never made a call at the village head's home. 
When people went to inquire what was going on, the Safari operator told 
them that the fence would follow the mountain range surrounding the village. 
All the land beyond the mountains would be used for hunting.
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When asked why he was not accepting the boundary which the people' had 
drawn he said that this did not give him enough hunting land. He said the 
village's proposed boundary incorporated some of his best hunting spots 
where he occasionally shot elephants. He said his own boundary would 
result in effective hunting which would mean more money to the village.
A few weeks later the Safari operator drove in his jeep into the village. 
During this trip he met a group of boys herding cattle, it is reported that he 
shot a dog belonging to one of the boys. He suspected the dogs to be 
poachers' dogs. About the same time he told a group of villagers that the 
borehole had been drilled to attract animals and that it was not for the them.
It was then that local debate about the Safari operator and the fencing 
scheme started. Some people said if the safari operator could just waik in an 
area settled by people and started to dig wells without the knowledge of the 
people, surely this was arrogance. Some saw, in the Safari operator's 
unilateral declaration of the positioning of the fence, a blatant violation of the 
ruies previously agreed. The village head remarked that iocai people feit 
offended by the operator's action. The village head remarked :
" What he means is that we spent the whole day on that first 
meeting planning nothing. Why did he call the meeting? Why 
did they agree with us about the terms of the fence if they did 
not mean to stick to these? They simply wanted to have our 
approval and then after that cheat us. The whole idea was a 
hoax. "
Some debated the implications of what the white had done. They said that 
because he broke promises and covenants, and treated people in an arrogant 
and authoritarian manner, the Safari operator showed himself to be a bad 
person to work with. They said because he went about killing dogs 
belonging to the community, the Safari operator proved to be a man who 
should not be trusted. A Video headman remarked :
11 " What assurance is there that he would keep his word 
concerning the people having access to resources inside the 
fence, or that the boundaries would shift as and when the 
community demanded. "
There were some who began to think in broader terms, speculating on the 
motives of the Safari operator. A Video chairman put it thus:
" It was only after he came secretly and started sinking
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men of fell upon them and beat them up. Then, at the end of October, the 
village - together with some Ndebeie and Shona immigrants - banded 
together and stormed the Safari operator’s temporary Camp. The learner 
hunter was absent. They burned the Camp down to the ground. A week 
later the Safari
Operator wrote to the Council that he was dropping the project from which 
he had lost over half a million dollars worth of property. He demanded that, 
as part of the compensation, his lease be extended for another five years. 
He demanded cash for the baiance. The Council had no choice.
Conclusion
Although the situation is rather confused and intertwined, it is possible to
isolate, in a systematic way, why villagers objected to , the proposed
technology :
1. People objected to the electric fence because they did not have 
sufficient information about what the technology wouid entail. This 
applies more to the early stage of the fence.
2. Villagers rejected the technology because the fence would deprive them 
of their vital natural resources such as iand, grazing pastures, poles, 
thatching grass, edible insects, etc. Of significance was the fact that 
Campfire revenue from this project would not be able to satisfy 
household needs.
3. Local people objected to the fence because they felt slighted and 
ignored, particularly in its implementation stage. The Safari operator 
rejected local views about where the borehole and the fence were to be 
located.
4. Many people felt that the people who introduced the fence were 
dishonest. The Safari operator broke the agreement on where the bore 
Hole would be, and the boundary of the village as drawn by the local 
people. The fact that the Safari operator and Council failed to honour 
their promises, led locals to doubt other pledges made.
5. Villagers objected to the fence because those introducing it did not 
respect them. The shooting of the dog revealed that the Safari operator 
was not only arrogant and disrespectful, but also authoritarian.
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boreholes that we 'read ' his plans. We knew that the white 
man was like a boy courting a girl, using a sweet tongue and 
promises. We knew that he would not keep his promises of 
providing fertilisers, of the tractors and the shifting boundaries.
We realised that, once the fence had been put in place, he 
would not allow us to have access. He was creating his own 
farm, his own 'nationalparks' in which even dogs would not be 
allowed to pass. "
During this time opposition to the fence was expressed freely at beer parties 
and churches. People feit this spoke about how the project wouid deprive 
them of their land and the natural resources. They complained that the 
revenue, from Campfire would not soive their household problem. Letters 
were sent to the Council expressing opposition to the project. When people 
sensed that Council and the Safari operator would go ahead with the fence, 
some started questioning Campfire. People said that it was because of 
Campfire that all these bad things were taking piace. An eider in the village 
remarked :
" Campfire is now ransoming everything that we have. First it 
was the animals. We no longer are allowed to kill animals. Now  
it is our land. How will we be able to survive without land. 
Campfire can not look after us. But as for this... let it be known 
that if  they (Safari operator and Council) do not want to put the 
fence where we want, then we do not want their fencing 
including their Campfire. "
The elder's remarks summarised public opinion.
A month after the elder spoke these things, the Safari operator drove his 
trucks full of equipment and workers for the fencing project. The workers 
pitched up tents and on site offices on top of the mountain. Although the 
Safari operator himseif did not stay at the Camp for a long time, he left his 
learner hunter to supervise the progress of the work.
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Work began in earnest in August and for a month things went smoothly. In 
October there were drunken people who wouid habituaiiy and conveniently 
pass by the fence and scoff at the learner hunter. Later there were isolated 
incidents of poles disappearing and being uprooted. These increased during 
the first half of the month. A report was made by the Safari operator to the 
Council with the result that a police detail, together with Council game- 
guards, was despatched. No sooner had they tried to tell people to stop 
what they were doing, and to give way to the joint project, than a group of
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6. Villagers objected to the fence because the operator did not want to 
exhaust solutions which they proffered. Because the Safari operator had 
historically failed to kill problem animals, people saw in the electric fence 
another attempt to spare the damned creatures. The electric fence must 
be rejected.
What then are the conclusions of this study? What can it add to the debate 
about why peasants generally reject technology? For technology to be 
successful, and to be adopted by people, it is necessary that it seeks to build 
on what people already have rather than reduce their current gains (Bailey, 
1977). St must add to the livelihood of the targeted people. Secondly, it 
must be that the people introducing the change must respect ail covenants 
hitherto agreed. Any revisions and subsequent modification must, even in 
cases where they are done in the interest of the targeted people, be mutually 
agreed. Thirdly, those intervening must show genuine respect for the people 
they work with. Among other things, that means respecting local protocol 
and conducting oneself in the expected way. Fourthly, those intervening 
must be wiiiing to implement existing alternatives before they can convince 
the people that the new technology can work.
If those introducing changes ignore these rules, it is possible that their 
potentially useful technology will be rejected. The tragic storming of the 
Safari operator's camp, and the destruction of valuable equipment, bears 
testimony to the point that the targeted community will devise means, 
dramatic if necessary, to resist the change (Dzingirai, 1993). it is also 
possible that the introduced technology may have the unintended effect of 
causing the people to reject even the basis upon which the technology is 
founded. In the case described, the project caused locals to ask for the 
suspension of Campfire. The project thus threatened to reverse national 
attempts to conserve wildlife and its effort to use it as a vehicle for local 
development.
11
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